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ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION AND ELECTRIC 
UTILITY REGULATION: COMPATIBILITY AND 
CONFLICT 
Douglas N. Jones* 
Richard A. Tybout** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Electric utility regulation falls into the area of public policy known 
as economic regulation. Economic regulation encompasses a range 
of government controls over the economic activities of business. The 
degree of governmental oversight inherent in these controls varies 
greatly. Suasion and appeal to "good corporate citizenship" bound 
the range at one end, while strict statutes, and vigorous surveillance 
and enforcement describe the other (intensive-control) end. In be-
tween these extremes, regulators place substantial trust in mana-
gerial motivations, the workability of markets, and the presumed 
happy coincidence of private with public interests over a broad spec-
trum of behavior. 
Public utility regulation occupies a sector toward the intensive-
control end of the economic regulation scale. Initiated by the states 
over a century ago for the control of railroads, economic regulation 
of selected monopoly (or near monopoly) industries has become a 
permanent feature of the American politico-economic landscape. In 
contrast to anti-trust laws, which attempt to break down privately 
contrived obstructions to competition, economic regulation accepts 
monopoly as a datum in some limited circumstances (in "natural" 
monopolies), and imposes on private management controls over 
price, service, reliability, earnings, accounting, financial structure, 
* Professor of Regulatory Economics, School of Public Administration, The Ohio State 
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article are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the National 
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and occasionally, investment decisions. Public utility regulation is a 
peculiarly American amalgam of privately-owned capital operated 
under comprehensive public oversight. 1 
The time-honored objective of economic regulation is protection of 
the consumer's pocketbook. Ratepayers and their representatives, 
with the assistance of the media, make this point clear in their 
appearances before regulatory commissions. Somewhat less popular 
an objective, but nonetheless forcefully urged upon regulatory com-
missions by the regulatees, is assuring the economic viability of the 
regulated business, upon which the existence of the service itself 
depends in the long run. Regulatory commissions are necessarily 
preoccupied with reconciling these two conflicting objectives. 
Now, enter a newcomer called "social regulation." Social regula-
tion encompasses all manner of noneconomic regulation: environ-
mental protection, consumer health and safety, worker health and 
safety, local economic development, and even hiring practices in-
tended to further a number of societal goals. There is a tendency in 
public policy to view economic and social regulation as independent 
of one another, with social regulation imposing constraints on the 
interplay of economic forces. "Law and order," a "clean environ-
ment," a "safe workplace," and like objectives are generally thought 
to have criteria of their own, independent of costs. When it comes 
to particular cases, however, these objectives are compromised by 
cost. This last fact is as it should be, because there are few things, 
not even the preservation of life, that can be treated as absolutes, 
that is, irrespective of cost in the broadest sense of the term "cost." 
The tragedy is not that we are forced to consider cost, but that we 
do not consider cost consistently. Our predisposition to think of social 
goals as absolutes blinds us to the implicit inconsistency with which 
we compromise them. One of the results of this predisposition is that 
we achieve a good deal less than we could if we explicitly considered 
cost in setting social goals. Such consideration would lead naturally 
toward a more efficient allocation of resources among the various 
social goals. 
This observation introduces the underlying message of the present 
article: social regulation will fall short of its potential achievement 
unless guided by economics. A corollary is that economic regulation, 
where applicable, provides a natural matrix in which to imbed social 
regulation. This is a statement of principle only, not an endorsement 
1 For a textbook discussion of the natural monopoly concept and related aspects of public 
utility regulation, see 2 A. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION, 113-71 (1970). 
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of all instances of economic regulation. Where economic regulation 
is not applicable, other means of introducing economics, on which 
this article will not comment, need to be found. 
As an example of how economic regulation may be used to improve 
social regulation, this article focuses on the interrelationship be-
tween the social regulation of air pollution control and the economic 
regulation of electric utility regulation. Initially, this article exam-
ines the organization of electric utility regulatory structures,and how 
they affect the interaction between the economic and social regula-
tors. This article then touches briefly on the utility accounting and 
the process by which electric power rates are set. Thirdly, this article 
discusses the use of tax law to influence the pollution control activ-
ities of utilities. From these three sections, a common pattern 
emerges: social regulation acts as a restraint on economic regulation. 
Like oil and water, current social regulation and economic regulation 
do not mix. This is a pity because the goals of social regulation are 
widely accepted, and the importance of efficiency to the economy is 
widely acknowledged. 
The final section speculates on the advantages and means of in-
tegrating economic and social regulation in the small sector of the 
economy occupied by electric utility regulation. That is, we are 
interested in how the oil and water can be made to mix. Neither 
environmental nor electric utility regulation are ready for complete 
unification, but an interesting amalgam might be formed in the future 
by combining the two in a common procedure in which the public 
interests of pollution control and rate control are considered simul-
taneously. Ideally, pollution control should enter the electric power 
pricing process as a cost subject to conventional cost controls, rather 
than as an autonomous constraint, as it does now. Such an amalgam 
could result in effective pollution control and effective rate control, 
as well as effective enforcement. What such an amalgam in this small 
sector of the economy might mean to the rest of the economy remains 
to be seen. Some steps toward pricing of pollution have been taken 
elsewhere, as we shall note. 2 If anything, these make the case for 
the integration of economic and social regulation all the stronger. 
II. THE ROLE OF ECONOMICS IN SOCIAL REGULATION 
The importance of economizing to achieve social goals is illustrated 
in two examples below. Where social goals are pursued as absolutes, 
2 The reference is to trading in emissions reduction credits (ERe's). See infra notes 26-27 
and accompanying text. 
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public policy is blind to the economic consequences of a given solu-
tion. Society's resources are allocated inefficiently. The result is an 
even greater compromise of social goals than otherwise necessary. 
Where economic factors are taken into account, social goals are 
achieved more efficiently, and compromise, though explicitly ac-
knowledged, is less damaging to the goals. 
First, consider estimates of cost per life saved of programs sup-
ported, operated, or mandated by the federal government. In the 
late 1970's, we were spending 3.75 times more to save a life in some 
medical programs than in others, 2.67 times more in some safety 
programs than in others, and 16 2/3 times more in some military 
programs than in others. Expenditures by the private sector that 
were mandated by society could be over $100,000,000 per life saved. 3 
Even though this is not the highest figure cited by Bailey, it is 1389 
times as much as the estimated cost ($72,000) that society paid to 
save a life by kidney transplant. 4 These data show that there is no 
systematic relationship between expenditures and lives saved, nei-
ther within the public sector nor between the public and private 
sectors. 
The figures imply that there are dramatic opportunities to use 
resources more effectively. For example, if we reduced the proposed 
standard for the chemical acrylonitrile, taxed the chemical industry 
for the amount saved, and spent the taxes for highway safety, we 
could save lives at approximately a thousand times the rate we save 
them by policies adopted for the chemical acrylonitrile. 5 We could 
save many more lives than we do now without consuming any more 
resources, but simply by reallocating our expenditures from the 
inefficient to the efficient programs. This conclusion assumes that 
we have no ethically acceptable way of distinguishing lives saved by 
one program from those saved by another program. 
How does it happen that public policy is so wide of the mark? No 
complete answer is attempted here, but we would suggest that the 
most important reason is that social regulation is not planned in a 
comprehensive way. The programs cited above and many others 
have been undertaken in response to a perceived need to do some-
thing, always particular to specific circumstances, but with no gen-
eral criteria as to what should be done. Public policy conceives of 
the goal of saving lives as an absolute. In practice, however, saving 
3 M. BAILEY, REDUCING RISKS TO LIFE (1980) (Table 4). 
4Id. 
5 Bailey gives an estimated cost per life saved by the proposed standard for acrylonitrile of 
$1,963,000 to $642,976,000. Id. 
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lives is subject to arbitrary constraints: we should do "whatever is 
necessary" or "whatever is technically feasible." But these are empty 
words. For example, it is technically feasible to do without auto-
mobiles and thereby eliminate all deaths arising from the use of 
automobiles. 
We depend on chance to settle the important question of how much 
resources we shall devote to saving lives. Chance, though, is never 
the same in two different programs. As a result of our collective 
unwillingness to address explicitly the economics of saving lives, we 
are saving far fewer lives than we could with the resources devoted 
to that purpose. 
Environmental statutes exemplify this unwillingness to address 
economics in social regulation. Environmental statutes characterist-
ically state their goals without reference to economic considerations. 
The Clean Air Act6 prohibits the balancing of costs and benefits, but 
a system of cost minimization is inherent in the emission-reduction 
credit program7 currently promoted by the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency, described below. The Water Pollution Control Amend-
ments of 19728 are famous for their absolute goal, stated in the 
preamble, "that the discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters 
be eliminated by 1985."9 At the same time, however, the amend-
ments somewhat inconsistently require only that, by 1983, permit-
tees meet effluent limitations based on the "best available technology 
economically achievable .... "10 
Needless to say, the goal of eliminating pollution discharges has 
faded. But it would be wrong to infer from this that economics 
conflicts with environmental protection. The opposite is the case. 
Only by economizing can we make best use of our resources and 
more effectively achieve pollution control, or any other social goal. 
Economics does not conflict with environmental protection. Econom-
ics conflicts with absolutes. Social regulation pays lip service to 
absolutes but finds economizing necessary, though it accepts econom-
ics with no consistent logic. 
Our second example is drawn from a study of effluent control costs 
in the Delaware Estuary.ll The study considered four methods of 
642 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7626 (1982). 
7 Major regulations in the emissions reduction credit program over the ten year period 
1975-84 are tabulated in Table 2 in T. TIETENBURG, EMISSIONS TRADING: AN EXERCISE IN 
REFORMING POLLUTION POLICY 10 (1985). 
8 Pub. L. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982». 
933 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(I)(1982). 
10 33 U.S.C. § 1312(b)(2)(A)(i)(1982) (emphasis added). 
11 Johnson, A Study of the Economics of Water Quality Management, 3 WATER RESOURCES 
RES. (1967). 
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assigning abatement responsibility among polluters for each of two 
levels of dissolved oxygen (DO) throughout the estuary and calcu-
lated costs for each method. See Table 1. The first method was 
uniform treatment (UT), in which the same proportional removal of 
oxygen-depleting wastes was imposed on all polluters. This approach 
is closest to present policy and ignores problems of enforcement. 
The second method assumed a uniform effluent change (UEC) 
throughout the basin. The reason pollution control costs are lower 
for this method than for the UT method is that the polluters them-
selves choose how much abatement is in their own self-interest. 
Those with high costs of abatement pay the charge and dump pol-
lutants into the river. Those polluters with low costs of abatement 
find abating less expensive than paying the charge. Thus, any given 
level of control (two levels are shown in Table 1) is achieved with 
varying levels of abatement among polluters, as opposed to the 
uniform abatement levels which the UT approach requires. 
DO Objective 
(ppm) 
2 
3-4 
TABLE 1. 
Cost of Treatment with Alternative Programs 
Program 
VT VEC ZEC 
(millions of dollars per year) 
5.0 2.4 2.4 
20.0 12.0 8.6 
LC 
1.6 
7.0 
Source: Johnson, Edwin L., A Study in the Economics of Water Quality Management, WATER 
RESOURCES RESEARCH, Vol 3, (Spring, 1967), at 297. 
The UEC approach is more efficient than the UT approach because 
those with low costs of pollution self-select to abate more; those with 
high costs of pollution self-select to abate less. The UEC approach 
adjusts the effluent charge level to produce the same total abatement 
as with UT. 
One might think that a surer way of achieving the result would 
be by commanding the polluters to proceed as calculated for UEC, 
but without levying the charge. The opposite is true, however, be-
cause enforcement of finely differentiated standards is an impossible 
concept. Enforcement of uniform standards is also impossible, 
though we keep trying. 12 The advantage of the effluent charge ap-
12 For a discussion, see Downing, Bargaining in Pollution Control, 11 POL'y STUD. J. 577-
85 (1983); Downing & Kimball, Enforcing Pollution Control Laws in the U.S., 11 POL'y STUD. 
J. 55-64 (1982). 
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proach is not limited to efficiency, but extends also to enforcement. 
Polluters respond to an emissions charge in the same way they 
respond to any cost of doing business: they minimize its effect on 
profits. In other words, as long as the cost of not polluting is less 
than the charge, polluters try to avoid the charge by not polluting. 13 
The third alternative in Table 1 is a zoned effluent charge (ZEC). 
Here, the Delaware Estuary was divided, on paper, into five zones, 
and different effluent charges were set for each zone. The charges 
were different because different levels of abatement can be imposed 
on different zones and still achieve the DO targets, due in part to 
natural aeration (self-treatment by the river) and synergistic rela-
tionships among the wastes. Efficiency is again improved, at least 
at the higher DO level. 
The last alternative, the least cost (LC) approach, is included 
primarily for reference purposes. The LC approach assumes that 
charges vary continuously over the hundred mile stretch of river. 
While we make no claim of administrative or enforcement practica-
bility, it should be noted that fully differentiated financial assess-
ments possess the same advantage over fully differentiated abate-
ment commands as do uniform charges over uniform abatement 
commands. In both cases, economic regulation via financial assess-
ments results in lower pollution control costs than does a system of 
inflexible abatement commands. As the Delaware Estuary study 
suggests, social regulators could make better progress towards solv-
ing a given problem, and use fewer resources, if social regulation 
were molded into a framework of economic regulations, rather than 
imposed as a separate system. 
How might social regulation be molded into a framework of eco-
nomic regulation? Can experience with electric utilities, which are 
subject to simultaneous economic and social regulation, provide in-
sights? In search of answers, we explore regulatory policy for the 
electric power industry, beginning with the structure of regulation. 
III. REGULATORY STRUCTURES 
At the state level, different agencies carry out environmental 
regulation and economic regulation of public utilities. There are no 
exceptions to this proposition, though in a few instances the state 
13 For a defense of this argument by a group of attorneys, as well as some other advantages 
of the effluent charge approach, see F. ANDERSON, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENT 
THROUGH ECONOMIC INCENTIVES (1977). 
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public utility commission (PUC) participates in some aspect of en-
vironmental regulation. As of 1984, PUC's in two states, Arkansas 
and Oklahoma, incorporated provisions limiting pollution emissions 
into their rules. 14 PUC's in two other states, Virginia and Washing-
ton, require compliance with clean air and water quality standards. 15 
In power plant siting, there is a necessary interplay of environmental 
and electric power concerns, including alternative transmission cor-
ridors or power-sharing arrangements. Statutes in three-fifths of the 
states require an "environmental review" of this process. 16 Similar 
issues can arise in design and location of pumped waste storage, 
where scenic (environmental) considerations are also present. Within 
some state governments, environmental regulators view economic 
regulatory agencies as good sources of information about the indus-
try. Furthermore, when a meeting is convened in state government 
offices on "energy matters," agency representatives from the con-
cerned departments-Environment, the Public Utility Commission, 
perhaps Economic Development, and Conservation-typically 
gather around the table. Aside from these interactions between the 
PUC's and environmental agencies, coordination and cooperation are 
minimal, and rarely affect individual agency behavior in terms of 
yielding turf or territory. 
The courts have further enforced the view that social regulation 
shall enter as a constraint on economic regulation. This point was 
made as early as 1971 in the area of air quality control for electric 
utilities. In 1970, the California Public Utility Commission overruled 
the Orange County Air Pollution Control District's denial of a South-
ern California Edison Company application to construct two electric 
power 'generating units. 17 The California Supreme Court found that 
in doing so, the Public Utility Commission "has acted in excess of 
its jurisdiction."18 Thus the California PUC was without authority 
to prevent a denial of operating rights to California Edison by the 
Orange County Air Pollution Control District. 
The area of ratemaking contains other examples of social regula-
tion acting as an external constraint on economic regulation. For 
example, it is the practice of utilities to charge pollution control 
14 NATIONAL ASS'N OF REGULATORY UTIL. COMM'RS, 1984 ANNUAL REPORT ON UTILITY 
AND CARRIER REGULATION 567 (Table 46). 
16Id. 
16Id. at 718 (Table 82). 
17 Re Southern California Edison Co., 86 Pub. Uti!. Rep. 3d (PUR) 482 (1970). 
18 Orange County Air Pollution Control Dist. v. California Pub. Uti!. Comm'n, 90 Pub. Uti!. 
Rep. 3d (PUR) 389, 396 (1971). 
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expenses to ratepayers. In 1971, the Virginia Supreme Court af-
firmed that expenses of environmental protection are allowable (i.e., 
a recoverable business cost) for rate making purposes. 19 Also in 1971, 
the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission allowed higher operat-
ing costs of an electric utility resulting from a switch of coal to oil 
in order to reduce sulfur emissions.20 The Pennsylvania Commission 
also addressed in 1971 how to allocate the "air quality fuel charge" 
among customer classes. 21 In 1974, the New York Public Service 
Commission affirmed that an electric power company's environmen-
tal costs should be included among operating expenses. 22 
As these examples show, the typical pattern is for social regulators 
independently to impose social regulations, perhaps after consulta-
tion with the regulated business firm and/or, in a few states, on the 
basis of information and advice from the PUC. Whatever the pro-
cess, the PUC is eventually faced with a fait accompli and must 
make a decision on whether expenses of social regulation accruing 
to the regulated firm are recoverable from rates charged by that 
firm. By adding yet another factor into the PUC's calculations, en-
vironmental agencies further complicate an already difficult job of 
reconciling low consumer rates with adequate utility earnings. 23 
Another facet of air pollution control involves three price-like 
mechanisms authorized by the national Environmental Protection 
19 Commonwealth of Va. v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 89 Pub. Util. Rep. 3d (PUR) 395 (1971). 
20 Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 91 Pub. Util. Rep. 3d (PUR) 
321 (1971). 
21Id. 
22 Opinion No. 74-5, Case 26402 (February 5, 1974). 
23 Two examples help make the general point. First power plants are designed and operated 
according to the engineering economics of system planners with the object of dispatching 
generating units so as to minimize costs under specific constraints. It would seem that to 
include a constraint of some given level of pollution control into the utility system program, 
while clearly feasible, would change the operating function from one of the conventional 
economic dispatch to the "social dispatch of power." Unless redefined, the relatively straight-
forward minimum cost criterion would seem to have been lost and the traditional basis for 
power dispatch made more ambiguous. 
Second, there is the issue of horizontal equity among firms and industries. Businesses care 
about their overall cost structures in relation to other business firms-particularly actual or 
potential competitors. Even (near) monopolies are not entirely immune from these consider-
ations. Not only can there be the question of intercompany and interregional competitiveness 
for power systems, there is also the matter of fuel switching that may alter the final oppor-
tunity for large power consumers to "shop around." Electric utilities must therefore pay more 
attention to the remaining competition to avoid losing customers to, say, the gas industry. 
The point here is that if en'9'ironmental protection requirements are unevenly applied within 
a region, or region-to-region, or industry-to-industry, the resulting cost functions of the firms 
will differ as will the final price of the service. 
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Agency (EPA). These are offsets, "bubbles", and emission reduction 
credits. The purpose of all three is to permit substitution of one 
source of air pollution for another with the result of reducing pollu-
tion control costs, as described below. The interesting, and perhaps 
curious, fact for our purposes is that the PUC's played no role in 
designing these three concepts and seem largely to be passive recip-
ients of their effects. This is unfortunate, for the three mechanisms 
explicitly involve economic issues important to both electric utilities 
and PUC's. 
Offsets are essentially barter agreements between pairs of pollu-
ters. For example, if a new source wants to enter a metropolitan 
area in which there is already too much air pollution, that source 
must find a polluter already in the air shed that is phasing out its 
pollution. The new source can then use the existing polluter's re-
duction in pollution as an "offset" to its pollution and thus gain rights 
to emit into the air shed. Offsets introduce the possibility of trading 
in "pollution rights." Cases exist in which a prospective entrant paid 
an already established polluter the cost of reducing the latter's pol-
lution. For example, Elliott reports that Sohio persuaded Southern 
California Edison to accept a $78 million stack-gas scrubber to re-
ceive a sulfur oxide offset that would permit Sohio to build a terminal 
in the Los Angeles area. 24 
"Bubbles" apply to groups of smoke stacks or air pollution sources 
under the control of a common owner. The image is that of a figu-
rative "bubble" around a plant. The only thing social regulation is 
concerned with is the pollution emanating from the "bubble," re-
gardless of which source inside the bubble the pollution caine from. 
Bubbles enable the plants to control pollution using the least costly 
method to control sources. 25 
Emission reduction credits (ERC's) are similar to offsets in that 
both allow trading of pollution "rights." Polluters who reduce emis-
sions below the limits set by the social regulators get ERC's for the 
amount of the reduction. The polluters are then allowed to sell these 
ERC's to others. Plants may also bank ERC's for later use, or lease, 
subject to a variety of rules that vary by local jurisdiction.26 Optimal 
24 Elliott, Full Cost Emissions ChargesJor the South Coast Basin, 7 THE ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROFESSIONAL 57 (1975). Sohio was forced to withdraw its application for other reasons. 
Several other examples of similar transactions involving offsets appear in T. TIETENBERG, 
ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCE ECONOMICS 306-07 (1984). 
25 See supra text accompanying notes 11-13. 
26 Leslie Sue Ritts et. al., "Comparison of Selected State Banking Rules," Environmental 
Law Institute (September 20, 1982). 
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allocation of pollution control would arise from a well-working ERC 
program. Those plants that are more efficient at controlling pollution 
have the incentive to do so and to then sell (or lease) their rights. 
Those that are less efficient have the incentive to spend their money 
on rights. ERC's achieve the same total abatement at lower cost 
than does uniform treatment, as the Delaware Estuary example 
shows. 27 
In developing the offsets, bubbles, and ERC's, the PUC's have 
been on the outside from the beginning, despite the obvious impli-
cations of these concepts for cost control. Raufer and Feldman con-
ducted a survey of members of both the electric power industry and 
economic regulatory commissions. They found the following for 
PUC's in the fourteen states thought to contribute the most to the 
acid rain problem: 
While the utilities were very familiar with emissions trading, 
the same cannot be said for the public utility commissions. Four 
of the fourteen PUC's were familiar with emissions trading. An 
identical number had never heard of it at all-including some of 
the key states likely to bear a considerable portion of the emis-
sions reductions. The remaining PUC's had heard of emissions 
trading, but were not familiar with its components. 
The PUC survey group split evenly concerning the likely role 
they would play in emissions trading in an acid deposition pro-
gram. Half said they have an environmental mandate and would 
take an active role in reviewing control options; the other half 
stated that they focused solely on economic and financial issues, 
and while they would probably review an emissions trade, major 
decisions on the matter would lie with the state's air pollution 
control agency. 28 
I t is not possible to focus on economic and financial issues without 
considering the costs of pollution control. Electric utility accounting 
is inevitably involved when an asset is acquired. ERC's are assets. 
But they are assets whose value is determined by the social regu-
lators. Social regulators set the standards, define the ERC's life 
duration, decide .whether the ERC's depreciate with time, approve 
or disapprove ERC trades and by other rules affect their value. 
Expenditures by a utility for ERC's mayor may not be approved 
'l:I For a discussion of offsets, bubbles and ERe's, see Tietenberg, Uncommon Sense: The 
Program to Reform Pollution Control Policy, in REGULATORY REFORM 290-301 (L. Weilss 
& M. Klass eds. 1986). 
28 Raufer & Feldman, Emissions Trading and What it May Mean for Acid Deposition 
Control, 114 PUB. UTIL. FORT., August 16, 1984, at 24. 
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by a PUC and, if approved, the expenditures must be taken into 
account in setting electric power rates. 
The EPA's new source performance standards (NSPS) for electric 
power plants29 illustrate how far we are from coordination of social 
and economic regulation. A minimum of seventy percent removal of 
sulfur oxides was required in 1979 for all new coal-fired generating 
plants, regardless of the sulfur concentration of the coal. 30 This 
requirement made the electricity from new power plants relatively 
more expensive in the growing areas of the West and South, where 
low sulfur coal might be used, than electric power from older plants 
in the East and Midwest, which are not subject to NSPS. According 
to a careful analysis by Crandall, the effect was deliberately political, 
designed to retard the economic development of the South and West 
for the benefit of the older industrial regions of the country, the 
Northeast and Great Lakes areas.31 Here, social regulation was used 
as a gimmick to counter economic rationality. 
More recently, the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment 
(OTA) investigated the merits of technology-forcing regulation in 
connection with acid rain control. The OTA estimated in 1984 that 
the mandated use of control technology (scrubbers) to achieve re-
quired emissions reductions of about 5 million tons would result in 
added annual costs of $1.4 billion.32 However, if emitters could choose 
the most cost effective method, such as low sulfur coal, the annual 
added cost would be between $600 million and $900 million (about 
fifty percent of the cost of mandated technology).33 Here, economic 
regulators could assist in assuring that the emitters had an interest 
in the least cost method, providing that social regulations did not 
prescribe the technology. 
To summarize our conclusions in this section: (1) pollution control 
is a cost of electric power production inherently outside the purview 
of PUC's because prescribed by social regulations, often specific to 
the technology that must be used; (2) at the forefront of pollution 
control regulation, offsets, bubbles, and ERC's offer the possibility 
of economizing; and (3) the PUC's have had very little to do with 
offsets, bubbles and ERC's, despite the importance of these concepts 
29 40 C.F.R. §§ 60AOa-A9a (1986). 
30 Id. § 60A3a(a); Portney, How Not to Create a Job, 6 REGULATION 36 (Nov.lDec. 1982). 
31 R. CRANDALL, CONTROLLING INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION 110-'30 (1983); see also B. ACK-
ERMAN & W. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR (1981). 
32 UNITED STATES CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, ACID RAIN AND 
TRANSPORTED AIR POLLUTANTS 169 (table A-7) (1984). 
33 Id. 
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for reducing electric power costs. The possible gains from more 
widespread use of offsets, bubbles, and ERC's are suggested by 
analogy with the preceding value-of-life34 and Delaware Estuary35 
examples. The broader context of pollution control policy continues 
to be dominated by counter-economizing, as suggested by Crandall's 
evaluation of NSPS's for coal-fired power plants36 and the OTA anal-
ysis of costs of acid rain control. 37 
None of the foregoing implies that we have either too much or too 
little pollution control, but only that pollution control is an economic 
problem and deserves to be tackled in an economic context. We are 
getting less pollution control than we could for the resources devoted 
to it as matters now stand. This result is inherent in the rejection 
of economics by public policy. One route to obtaining more pollution 
control and better cost control of electric power is to better integrate 
decisions on the two. 
IV. UTILITY ACCOUNTING AND REGULATORY PRACTICE 
This section describes how pollution control costs are treated in 
economic regulation. Not only are pollution control costs indepen-
dently implied by social regulations, as noted in the preceding sec-
tion, but they are also accommodated in ways that abridge pre-
existing cost control practices of economic regulation. And, as if to 
further confound a disinterested observer, these abridgements were 
initiated by the Federal Power Commission, the nation's leading 
economic regulatory agency in electric power at the time. 
The single most important guideline in rate level, or earnings 
control cases is the "fair return on fair value" rule: 
RR = OE + CD + r(OC + I - D).38 
Here, 
RR = the Revenue Requirement (total dollars to be raised); 
OE = Operating Expense (of doing business); 
CD = Current Depreciation; 
r = the Rate-of-Return (percent earnings on the value of the 
capital employed in the business); 
34 See supra text accompanying notes 3-4. 
35 See supra text accompanying notes 11-13. 
36 See supra text accompanying note 31. 
37 See supra text accompanying note 32. 
38 For present purposes, complexities resulting from taxes and alternative methods of 
property valuation are ignored. 
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Original Cost (of the capital employed, sometimes partly 
adjusted for inflation); 
Improvements (in the capital employed); and 
Accumulated Depreciation (in value of the capital em-
ployed). 
This formula is used by PUC's from time to time to set a target for 
rate adjustments. It is not used for continuous rate adjustment, 
except in the case of fuel cost increases, which, in many jurisdictions, 
are automatically reflected in rate increases. 
The distinction between increases in operating expenses and cap-
ital is important. The utility recovers operating expenses on a one 
to one basis. Property increments, however, carry with them an 
added revenue benefit for the utility in the form of the rate of return. 
Other things being equal, and with a rate of return at least as high 
as utility stockholders could otherwise earn, the utility has an inter-
est in adding to property, as long as regulators include that property 
in the rate base, i.e., in the expression in brackets in the above 
equation. This fact makes any investment that the regulatory com-
missions find "used and useful" for power generation,39 including 
pollution control equipment,40 more attractive to the utility. Envi-
ronmental agencies and other parties of similar interest should take 
this incentive situation into account. 
Another important consideration in rate setting is the much-dis-
cussed Construction Work in Progress (CWIP). The debate about 
the appropriateness of CWIP in utility regulation focuses on the 
question of whether additions to a plant should be excluded from 
rate base-and thus prohibiting the utility from earning a return on 
the cost of the additions-until the plant is "on-line" and operational, 
or whether these construction costs should wholly or partly be added 
to rate base, along the way-and hence currently payable by the 
rate paying public-even before the plant can meet the traditional 
"used and useful" test. It is in the use of the latter convention, that 
is, including CWIP in the rate base, that social regulation led the 
way to some crumbling of traditional cost control. 
Before 1976 the Federal Power Commission (FPC), which had 
regulatory authority over the transmission and sale at wholesale of 
39 The term "used and useful" is a term of art in the utility regulation field. In its strictest 
application it refers to the investment in plant and equipment in service and necessary to the 
utility's doing business. 
40 There are states, however, in which the financing of this portion of the investment is 
handled in such a manner that PUC's exclude it as an earning asset. 
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electric energy in interstate commerce, did not allow CWIP in the 
rate base of utilities under its jurisdiction.41 In December, 1976, the 
FPC announced three exceptions to this prohibition. Only two of 
these concern us here. The FPC declared that, essentially from 1977 
onward, CWIP treatment would be accorded to: (1) construction of 
pollution control facilities, and (2) conversion from oil and gas plants 
to plants using another fuel (primarily coal). 42 
The reasoning behind the FPC's singling out of environmental 
matters for preferential treatment with respect to regulatory ac-
counting is instructive. At the time, the FPC placed considerable 
weight on the intertemporal argument against CWIP. The basic 
argument was that it was unfair to make current ratepayers pay for 
facilities they might not use, and that would otherwise be provided 
by future ratepayers. In spite of this disinclination, the FPC issued 
the following order: 
At the present time, there is only one area where the Commis-
sion has agreed for all companies that [it would be equitable to 
impose the cost of future facilities on current users]. This is in 
the area of facilities which are required because of the current 
generation's commitment to the control of pollution, of its con-
sumption of existing stocks of natural resources. Thus, we will 
allow the inclusion of CWIP in rate base where construction is 
to facilities to be used for pollution control, or for the conversion 
to the burning of other fossil fuels of plants which now burn oil 
or gas. In these cases, it is the profligacy of the present gener-
ation which requires the new facilities, and we consider that the 
equitable argument favoring this allocation of costs is sufficient 
to tip the balance in favor of the allowance of CWIP of these 
facilities. 43 
The FPC confined the use of this feature somewhat by noting that 
it did not intend inclusion of CWIP to apply to facilities that lessen 
pollution by substituting a different non-polluting method of power 
generation, nor to facility additions for generation of the extra power 
needed for the operation of the pollution control equipment itself. 44 
The FPC sought to further confine its employment by citing "as a 
41 For a discussion of the "fair return on fair value" rule, see supra text accompanying note 
38. 
42 FPC Docket No. RM75-13, Order No. 55, "Order Adopting in Part Construction Work 
in Progress Rulemaking and Terminating Proceedings," November 8, 1976, at 14-16. The 
third case was for a clear showing of severe financial difficulty by a utility which cannot 
otherwise be reasonably alleviated. 
43 Id. at 8-9. 
44 Id. at 9. 
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useful guide" the Internal Revenue Service's language in defining 
allowable tax treatment of pollution control facilities.45 Finally, the 
FPC offered examples of pollution control items it did have in mind 
as qualifying for CWIP treatment. These examples were: 
1. Air pollution control facilities: 
a. Scrubbers, precipitators, tall smokestacks 
b. Changes necessary to accommodate use of environmentally 
clean fuels such as low ash or low sulfur fuels including 
storage and handling equipment 
c. Monitoring equipment; 
2. Water pollution control facilities: 
a. Cooling towers, ponds, piping pumps 
b. Waste water treatment equipment 
c. Sanitary waste disposal equipment 
d. Oil interceptors 
e. Sediment control facilities 
f. Monitoring equipment; 
3. Solid waste disposal costs: 
a. Ash handling and disposal equipment 
b. Land 
c. Settling ponds. 46 
The societal goal of a cleaner environment is the force behind this 
federal regulatory commission's actions with respect to power pro-
duction. The fact that the FPC (and now the Federal Energy Reg-
ulatory Commission (FERC» never allowed CWIP in the rate base 
on the basis of "severe financial distress" the five times (by 1983) 
that utilities used that non-environmental argument in seeking such 
inclusion indicated the narrowness of the agency's intended appli-
cation of CWIP.47 In short, utilities could not use CWIP to prop up 
utility earnings except in the most compelling cases, but could use 
CWIP as an incentive for environmental improvement. Some evi-
dence of the power of that incentive appears in Table 2. 
45 [d. That definition includes "a new identifiable treatment facility which is used ... to 
abate or control water or atmospheric pollution or contamination by removing, altering, 
disposing or storing of pollutants, contaminants, wastes, or heat .... " I.R.C. § 169(d)(1) 
(1982). 
46 FPC Docket No. RM75-13, Order No. 55 at 10-11. 
47 LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, CONSTRUCTION WORK IN 
PROGRESS 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1982). After 1984 the FERC liberalized its use of CWIP. 
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Thus, as Table 2 shows, at the end of 1980, investor-owned electric 
utilities had reported $20.5 billion in electric plants in service attrib-
utable to environmental protection facilities. Also $6.58 billion of 
environmental CWIP was recorded. This last figure accounted for 
about 11 percent of all electric CWIP at that time. By the end of 
1984 almost $13 billion more had been added to plant, and CWIP 
had increased by about $3.3 billion. 
Investment in environmental protection facilities implies spending 
on their operation. Table 3 indicates the magnitude and types of 
these expenses in 1980 and 1984. In the four-year period total en-
vironmental protection expenses for electric utilities rose from $1.6 
billion to $2.2 billion, or by about 38 percent. Those environmental 
protection expenses accounted for 2.9 percent and 3.6 percent of 
total power production of electric utilities' expenses in each of the 
same two years, respectively. 
State commission actions with respect to CWIP treatment, how-
ever, are mixed. While the situation is not static, the count by early 
1985 was something like the following:48 about 12 states bar the 
admission of CWIP under any circumstance; another 8 states allow 
it unconditionally; and the remaining 30 permit conditional use of 
TABLE 2. 
Environmental Protection Facilities, Cumulative Investments 
1980 and 1984 (thousands of dollars) 
Amount 
Item 1980 
(Included in electric utility plant in service) 
Air pollution control facilities $ 8,992,909 
Water pollution control facilities 3,752,447 
Solid waste disposal costs 1,227,815 
Noise abatement costs 196,988 
Esthetic costs 4,593,318 
Additional plant capacity 1,144,027 
Miscellaneous protection facilities 595,603 
Total $20,503,097 
Construction work in progress $ 6,577,308 
1984 
$15,525,903 
6,148,600 
1,847,816 
237,882 
6,306,860 
1,537,204 
1,428,056 
$33,032,321 
$ 9,914,206 
Source: STATISTICS OF PRIVATELY OWNED ELECTRIC UTILITIES IN THE UNITED STATES 
(1980) at 574, and FINANCIAL STATISTICS OF SELECTED ELECTRIC UTILITIES (1984) at 738-
39, Energy Information Administration, Washington, D.C. 
48 1984 ANNUAL REPORT ON UTILITY AND CARRIER REGULATION, supra note 14, at 450-
51 (Table 14a). 
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TABLE 3. 
Environmental Protection Expenses, 1980 and 1984 (thousands of dollars) 
Item 
Depreciation 
Labor, maintenance, material, and supplies 
Fuel, related costs 
Operation 
Fly ash and sulfur removal 
Difference in cost of environmentally clean fuel 
Replacement power costs 
Taxes and fees 
Administrative and general 
Other 
Total 
Amount 
1980 1984 
$ 212,630 $ 437,931 
275,048 498,636 
49,341 72,179 
112,735 149,156 
817,260 780,641 
45,698 47,501 
14,213 46,497 
24,651 54,765 
67,228 93,564 
$1,618,797 $2,180,870 
Source: STATISTICS OF PRIVATELY OWNED ELECTRIC UTILITIES IN THE UNITED STATES 
(1980) at 575, and FINANCIAL STATISTICS OF SELECTED ELECTRIC UTILITIES (1984) at 752, 
Energy Information Administration, Washington, D.C. 
CWIP. About a dozen of the states that allow CWIP in some situa-
tions follow the original FPC criteria in varying degrees. 49 One state 
and the District of Columbia allow CWIP in rate base only for 
pollution control expenditures. The exact category in which a state 
falls can vary from year to year, but the figures are representative. 
A further element in the PUC's treatment of CWIP is whether 
the estimated interest that could be earned on funds used during 
construction is required to be an offset to CWIP at the time of plant 
completion or whether the allowance from funds used during con-
struction (AFUDC) amounts become an additional part of the rate 
base. 50 If an offset, rates to ratepayers would be lower than when 
not an offset. At least two states that otherwise require AFUDC 
offsets against CWIP do not require offsets in the case of pollution 
control CWIP.51 Thus, to an important degree, state commission 
policy follows federal policy in giving special status to pollution 
control investments. 
One might assert that the general softening of public utility reg-
ulation toward CWIP would have taken place in the absence of 
pollution control. We refer to the dozen states that unconditionally 
49Id. 
ro Id. 
61 The states are Delaware and Virginia. I d. 
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(without reference to pollution control considerations) include CWIP 
in the rate base and the rather large intermediate group that allow 
CWIP in circumstances extending beyond pollution control. In the 
former group of states, the embrace of the CWIP concept probably 
implies a dominant concern to bolster earnings. In the latter group, 
it is impossible to say how much weight the states give to general 
earnings considerations and how much to pollution control. Both 
considerations are undoubtedly present. Whatever the cause for the 
use of CWIP to bolster earnings in general, there can be no doubt 
that CWIP's present status results in part from the way we are 
financing pollution control. In the broader context of this analysis, 
the preferential treatment of pollution control costs reflects an adop-
tion by economic regulation of the same absolutist view of pollution 
control as characterizes public policy in general. As before, we note 
that an absolutist view plays havoc with the achievement of the 
social goal it is intended to promote. Here we add that it plays havoc 
with cost control in economic regulation. Stated differently, society 
attempts to make up for failures of our pollution control policy by 
weakening economic regulation. 
V. TAX PREFERENCES AND REGULATION 
Additional preferential treatment of pollution control expenditures 
comes through tax policy. Tax law constrains public utility regulators 
to assure that tax breaks accrue to the benefit of the utilities, as 
opposed to electric power consumers. These tax breaks are especially 
important for pollution control equipment, though they apply to 
other investments as well. Electric utilities, more than most Amer-
ican industries, benefit from tax breaks for pollution control. Thus, 
electric utilities made 31 to 37 percent of all pollution control expen-
ditures by all American industries in the period of 1980-84.52 
The question is not whether we have pollution control, but who 
pays for it. To the extent that the public pays for it (via tax pref-
erences in the present context), there is no incentive for efficient 
pollution control by the polluters, nor do polluters have an economic 
reason to restrain pollution, to adopt cost-saving technologies, or 
even to develop these technologies in the first place. Here, again, 
social goals could be more efficiently and completely achieved if social 
regulation were better integrated into the economy. Examples of 
52 Russo & Rutledge, Plant and Equipment Expenditures by Business for Pollution Abate-
ment, 1983 and Planned, 1984, 64 SURV. OF CURRENT BUSINESS 34 (1984). 
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mischief created by a failure to address economic aspects of social 
regulation arise in the value-of-life case,53 the Delaware Estuary 
case,54 discussion of the Congressional OTA study,55 and in the 
abridgment of cost control via CWIP and attenuated surveillance of 
pollution control investments in general by public utility regulators. 56 
Consider now the tax preference case. 
The special treatment that economic regulation gives pollution 
control investments is comparable to a variety of ways public policy 
in general subsidizes pollution control. Some of these ways, such as 
federal matching grants for municipal waste treatment, are not rel-
evant for electric power generation. Others, such as loan guarantees 
for small business, touch only a small part of the electricity industry. 
To the extent that pollution control subsidies are important for elec-
tric utilities, these subsidies mostly take the form of tax preferences. 
Tax preferences give rise to "tax expenditures", or revenue losses 
to the United States Treasury while enhancing the revenue of the 
affected companies. 57 In all cases, tax preferences for pollution are 
available to unregulated as well as regulated (economically regu-
lated) industries. These tax preferences take three forms: industrial 
development bonds,58 investment tax credits,59 and the accelerated 
cost recovery system.60 Each of these tax preferences will be dis-
cussed separately. 
63 See supra text accompanying notes 3-4. 
54 See supra text accompanying notes 11-13. 
66 See supra text accompanying notes 32-33. 
56 See supra text accompanying notes 41-51. 
57 The Congressional Budget Act of 1974 requires that the Treasury estimate such losses, 
Pub. L. 93-344 § 601, 88 Stat. 297, 323 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 1105(a)(16) (1982), 
on the ground that there is no essential difference between an explicit grant and the foregoing 
of tax revenue for the same purpose. The estimates are subject to some conceptual and 
measurement problems in practical application, but nevertheless estimates of tax expendi-
tures, to the extent available, give us a basis on which to judge the relative importance of 
this form of subsidy. 
58 I.R.C. § 103(b) (1982 & Supp. 1985). The requirements of tax exempt obligations used to 
finance activities other than general governmental activities are severely restricted under The 
Tax Reform Act of 1986. Pub. L. 99-514 § 1301, 1986 U.S. CODE & ADMIN. NEWs-SPECIAL 
TAX PAMPHLET (100 Stat.) 518, 2 Fed. Taxes (p. 17) ~ 8100.04 (Oct. 23, 1986). The analysis 
to follow is therefore largely of historic significance. 
59 I.R.C. §§ 38, 46-48 (1982 & Supp. 1985). The investment tax credit is repealed by the 
Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-514 § 211, 1986 U.S. CODE & ADMIN. NEWs-SPECIAL 
TAX PAMPHLET (100 Stat.) 82, for property placed in service after December 31, 1985, except 
for property covered by transitional rules, certain qualified progress expenditures and a select 
portion of timber property. The analysis to follow is therefore of historic significance only. 
60 I.R.C. § 168 (1982 & Supp. 1985). The accelerated cost recovery system (ACRS) is 
somewhat modified by the Tax Reform Act of 1986 for property placed in service after 
December 31, 1986. Pub. L. 99-514 § 201, 1986 U.S. CODE & ADMIN. NEWs-SPECIAL TAX 
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A. Industrial Development Bonds 
State and local governments issue industrial development bonds 
(IDB's) for private purposes. For over a decade, state and local 
governments have been turning to IDB's to promote selected private 
sector activities, including local economic development. As with state 
and local bonds in general, interest payments are exempt from fed-
eral taxation.6! The special feature of IDB's is that the proceeds of 
the bonds are used for the direct benefit of private businesses, 
organizations or individuals. From 1975 to 1983, the total volume of 
long-term, tax-exempt bonds issued by state and local governments 
tripled, from approximately $30 billion to $93.3 billion. During the 
same period, the private-purpose component of these totals in-
creased six fold, from slightly below $10 billion to $59.4 billion. 62 
Thus, approximately 64 percent of all state and local long-term bond 
issues were for private purposes by 1983. Of the $59.4 billion private 
issue, approximately $40 billion were for IDB's and the leading single 
purpose among the latter was pollution control with $11.8 billion.63 
The corresponding tax expenditures for pollution control bonds of 
over 1 year life were estimated at approximately $1 billion in 1983.64 
In addition, state corporate income tax laws often allow credits 
against corporate income taxes to firms making pollution control 
expenditures. 65 And local property taxation often exempts from as-
sessed valuation of utilities the amounts represented by investment 
in pollution control facilities. 66 
B. ACRS and ITC 
The Accelerated Cost Recovery System (ACRS), introduced by 
the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981,67 is an alternative to pre-
existing accelerated depreciation. In combination with the Invest-
ment Tax Credit (ITC),68 ACRS offers such great advantages to the 
PAMPHLET (100 Stat.) 37. The modifications retain many of the original ACRS features. The 
only kind of investment for which a substantial change is made is real estate. 
61 I.R.C. § 103(b) (1982 & Supp. 1985). 
62 Clark & Neubig, Private Activity Tax-Exempt Bonds, 1983, 4 STATISTICS OF INCOME 
BULL., 97-98, 103 (1984). 
63 [d. (Table 1). 
64 U.S. Treasury, SPECIAL ANALYSES: BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GoVERNMENT, 
FISCAL YEAR 1985, G-44 (Table G-1). 
66 [All States Statutes Summaries] State Tax Guide 664 (July 1986). 
66 [d. 
In Pub. L. 97-34 § 201, 95 STAT. 203 (1981). 
68 I.R.C. §§ 38, 46-48 (1982 & Supp. 1985), repealed by Pub. L. 99-514 § 211, 1986 U.S. 
CODE & ADMIN. NEWS-SPECIAL TAX PAMPHLET (100 Stat.) 32. 
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taxpayer that it has almost completely eclipsed pre-existing accel-
erated depreciation. 
The annual write-off of ACRS property is determined by applying 
a statutory percentage from IRS tables to the basis of the asset. 69 
Accelerated depreciation is built into the tables. Congress has as-
signed pollution control equipment a 5 year life, regardless of its 
expected true life. 70 In both the assigned 5 year life and the built-in 
schedule of accelerated amortization, there is a tax preference. Both 
ITC and ACRS can apply to the same investment, though the amount 
of the investment that is depreciable, referred to as "basis," is 
reduced slightly by the investment tax credit. 71 
There are no estimates of the tax expenditure effects of ACRS. 
It is so widely applicable that it is defined as a norm from which tax 
expenditures are calculated. There are tax expenditure estimates 
available for the investment tax credit which apply to the entire 
economy. From these a very rough, order-of-magnitude estimate can 
be made as follows for pollution control. The Treasury estimated the 
aggregate tax expenditures for the investment credit in 1984 at 
$21. 715 billion (the sum of $1.43 and $20.285 billion, for cases with 
and without employee stock ownership plans, respectively).72 Now, 
simply pro-rate these investment credit tax expenditures according 
to the ratio of total non-farm investment in pollution control plant 
and equipment to total non-farm business plant and equipment ex-
penditure in the nation in 1984. This ratio is 2.22 percent on the 
basis of planned expenditures, and was 2.39 percent in 1983 on the 
basis of realized expenditures. 73 Using a value of 2.3 percent gives 
approximately $500 million for the tax expenditure due to the in-
vestment credit on pollution control facilities. This estimate is surely 
high because pollution control facilities benefit much more than other 
non-farm business plant and equipment from the use of IDB's. Where 
IDB's are used, 5 percent rather than 10 percent investment tax 
credit applies. 74 Considering this fact, a low tax expenditure estimate 
(which probably brackets the correct number) would be half as much, 
or $250 million. 
69 3 Fed. Taxes (P-H) ~~ 15,001 (1986). 
70 I.R.C. § 169(a) (1982). 
71 I.R.C. § 291(a)(5) (Supp. 1985). 
72 U.S. TREASURY, SPECIAL ANALYSES: BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, 
FISCAL YEAR, 1986, Table G-2. 
73 Ratios were calculated using Russo & Rutledge, supra note 52, for pollution control 
investments, and Seskin & Sullivan, Revised Estimates of New Plant and Equipment Expen-
ditures in the United States, 1947-1983, 65 SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS 16 (1985) for total 
business plant and equipment expenditures. 
74 I.R.C. § 46(c)(5)(B) (1982). 
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Again, all three tax preferences, IDB's, lTC, and ACRS, can be 
applied simultaneously. The results are not additive, but clearly are 
more preferential than any two alone would be, and the combination 
does more for pollution control than for industrial plant and equip-
ment in general. 
One of the consequences of these subsidy policies is to reduce the 
efficiency with which pollution is abated. Apart from the a priori 
expectation that beneficiaries will not exercise the same vigilance in 
cost control with subsidized as with unsubsidized expenditures, there 
are more fundamental allocational inefficiencies. Because pollution 
control tax preferences apply only to identifiable pieces of equip-
ment, they introduce a bias toward end-of-the-pipe technologies, as 
opposed to in-process technologies. The former assume the creation 
of pollution and then attempt to deal with the removal of pollution; 
the latter reduce the generation of pollution during production ac-
tivity. An example of an end-of-the-pipe technology would be a stack 
gas scrubber. An example of an in-process technology would be a 
method of fuel preparation that increases heat recovery, leading to 
less stack gas per unit of heat generated. The distinction is relevant 
here because it accounts for the difference between investments that 
are relatively more subsidized (the separable, end-of-the-pipe in-
vestments) from those which are not (the inseparable, in-process 
investments). Without the special tax preferences for pollution con-
trol equipment, the relative importance of in-process (inseparable) 
investments would increase and the overall cost to society of pollu-
tion control would be reduced. 
A third inefficiency resulting from tax preferences is the bias 
toward capital-intensive technologies that is inherent in the subsi-
dizing of capital but not operating expenses. Once again, the subsidy 
of some and not of other kinds of pollution control technologies biases 
the choice made by the polluter and thereby obstructs the selection 
of least-cost methods of pollution control. 75 
c. Regulatory Accounting 
Most regulatory commissions, state and federal, make accounting 
provisions to assure that the aforesaid tax preferences result in 
earnings to the utility rather than rate reductions to the public. This 
75 It is interesting to note that the two allocational biases (between (1) separable and 
nonseparable technologies and (2) capital and noncapital inputs) arise out of efforts to assure 
cost control and prevent fraud, our first form of inefficiency. Expenditures for separable pieces 
of equipment can be audited. Nonseparable expenditures and those for noncapital inputs are 
more difficult to audit. 
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was clearly the intent of the tax preferences and, like it or not, the 
commissions are engaged in carrying out what is essentially a leg-
islative policy-the policy of subsidizing pollution control. 
By 1985 approximately 40 state commissions prescribed normali-
zation accounting of ITC preferences by their utilities and more than 
that number allowed such treatment. 76 The term "normalization" as 
used here means that the tax benefit is not passed on to consumers 
immediately but is amortized over time on a straight line basis. 
Between the time that a tax benefit is received and the time con-
sumers are benefitted by it, the utility has the use of the revenue. 
In addition to allQwing normalization accounting of ITC preferences, 
approximately 49 state commissions allow accelerated depreciation; 
42 of these specifically permit rapid amortization of pollution control 
facilities. 77 The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 198178 prohibits state 
regulatory commissions from attempting to capture these tax ben-
efits for consumers in the year in which they are earned. 79 Consistent 
with this requirement, state commissions normalize ACRS benefits 
as well. 
The whole process can create an unfortunate dynamic; in order to 
make up for the costs of current excess capacity, it is necessary to 
invest in more capacity. Otherwise, the favorable earning effects of 
ACRS and ITC will vanish and, in fact, be replaced by adverse 
effects late in the life of the investments, when the normalized 
benefits to consumers exceed the earnings benefits tQ the utility. 
The following numbers are indicative of the value of the workings 
of the investment tax credit and the accelerated depreciation pro-
visions of the federal tax laws. For electric utility company use of 
ITC and accelerated depreciation tax preferences during the 1950's 
and 1960's for all types of investment, the estimated tax revenue 
losses ran about half a billion dollars annually.80 They grew rapidly 
in the 1970's and exceeded $4.3 billion annually by the end of the 
decade.81 Cash flow benefits deriving to the electric utilities, which 
were about $150 million annually in the late 1950's, amounted to 
some $2.3 billion in 1978.82 These figures suggest that the prefer-
76 1984 Annual Report on Utility and Carrier Regulation, supra note 14, at 569 (Table 47). 
77 Id. 
78 Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (1981). 
79 1984 Annual Report on Utility and Carrier Regulation, supra note 14, at 568. 
1M) Kiefer, The Diminishing Federal Income Tax Burden of the Public Utilities: Measure-
ment and Analysis, 33 NAT'L TAX J. 393, 399 (1980). 
SlId. 
82 Id. at 399, 401. 
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ential treatment in regulatory accounting of tax subsidies helped 
promote a surge in construction of unneeded electric capacity, some 
of which turned out to be excess of actual demand. 
Partly as a result of the disproportionate share of pollution control 
investments in the electric utility industry,83 the electric utility in-
dustry has benefitted more than the corporate sector generally from 
these tax provisions. The average income tax liabilities for both were 
about the same during the mid-1950's. Beginning in 1964 and con-
tinuing to the end of the 1970's, the effective tax rate of the electric 
utilities declined to one-fifth the average of the whole corporate 
sector.84 Three kinds of inefficiencies resulted in the process: (1) cost 
control problems; (2) misallocation between separable and nonsepar-
able capital investments; and (3) misallocation between capital in-
vestments and other inputs. 
What might be done about those problems? The single most im-
portant measure would be to eliminate the subsidies. If polluters 
;4 were free to abate in whatever way they found most economical, 
they would master their own cost control problems, they would 
choose between end-of-the-pipe and in-process technologies on a 
least-cost bases, and they would balance expenditures among all 
inputs on the same least-cost basis. All of these objectives would be 
served by imposing on utilities an emissions charge per unit of 
pollution released into the environment. At the same time enforce-
ment problems would be greatly reduced. 85 
In the broader context of this analysis, tax policy for pollution 
control is like CWIP for pollution control. Both give the financial 
advantages to electric utilities if they install pollution control de-
vices. The implication is that contemporary social regulation would 
otherwise be unable to do the job. We believe this to be the case. 
Our remedy is to bring more economics into the social regulation 
process. In the electric utility industry, this means coordinating 
economic and social regulation. 
VI. TOWARD COORDINATING ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REGULATION 
Our focus has been on only one kind of social regulation-environ-
mental-and one industry-electric utilities-subject to economic 
regulation. But the principles are illustrative and have broad signif-
83 See Russo, supra note 52. 
84 Kiefer, supra note 80, at 399. 
85 See ANDERSON, supra note 13. 
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icance. The administrative challenges of coordination at the local 
level and the overriding priority given to the new (social) regulation 
arise from a common cause; the imposition of social measures (often 
absolutes) with very little recognition of the nature of the economic 
context in which the problems arise. 
In our national policy innocence, we legislate social goals as though 
they are unrelated to economic considerations and, in our adminis-
trative practice, compromise these social goals according to hap-
penstance. This is hardly integration. There is no such thing as an 
absolute (a goal pursued without reference to cost) in economics and 
very little recognition of a relative (the need for trade-off) in social 
policy. The inherent incompatibility of our current brand of social 
regulation with economizing has led to a number of inefficiencies that 
are made worse by subsidy. The latter is brought in for want of 
success in achieving social goals by command and control. The situ-
ation is illustrated especially at the interface of economic and social 
regulation, but our examples extend also to other parts of the econ-
omy. 
If coordination of economizing and social goals is to be achieved, 
economic and social regulation must be more overtly reconciled. 
Because economic criteria are more explicit than social criteria and 
economic regulation has evolved over a longer period of time than 
social regulation, this regulatory system may be used as the matrix 
for institution-building, at least for the purpose of developing a model 
and not with any implied endorsement of particular administrative 
bodies. The simplest case is the one we have reviewed herein: en-
vironmental regulation of electric utilities. 
Economic regulation is intended to take the place of the market, 
not the place of management. Economic regulation controls prices, 
conditions of service, profits, and only as much internal operation of 
the regulated firm, such as the system of accounts, as is necessary 
to make effective its control of profits. Economic regulation does not 
attempt to prescribe technologies. There are plenty of problems in 
doing what economic regulation seeks to do. Those problems pale, 
however, in comparison with the problems of successfully operating 
an economic system by public prescription of technologies, as shown 
by the Delaware Estuary example. 
Rather than attempt to prescribe technologies, a more promising 
approach for social regulation is to guide behavior in the private 
sector by a system of financial penalties for performance (or lack of 
performance). A familiar basis for financial penalties is public dam-
ages. The erstwhile polluter faced with financial penalties has the 
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incentive to find its own way to control pollution. There is no need 
for, and much to lose from, prescribing the technology a firm shall 
use. But there is a need for comprehensive, accurate, continuous 
monitoring of pollution output, which is presently lacking. 86 
If environmental regulation were directed toward setting financial 
penalties, then integration with economic regulation could follow 
naturally. The electric utility sector operates in an institutional and 
regulatory structure of long standing that is conducive to handling 
new regulatory requirements imposed from outside. The process for 
doing so is established and certain. Detailed accounting arrange-
ments exist for accommodating the investments and expenses asso-
ciated with pollution control facilities. The electric utility sector 
seems to be ideal for what can be described as the conversion of 
social cost functions-the negative externalities of environmental 
degradation historically paid for by the public in the form of pollution 
damages-to private cost functions paid for by utility companies. 
,Ii Taken one step further, the new (social) regulatory requirements 
. i need not be introduced after the fact, but should evolve in the course 
of economic regulation. Rate hearings before the economic regulators 
would be an occasion for considering the interests of the pollution-
victimized public. The environmental regulators would be advocates 
for this party. Already many parties with many points of view ex-
press their interest in utility rates in this forum. Low income rate-
payers and their advocates argue for life-line rates, inverted rate 
structures, credit under dire financial circumstances, and other con-
siderations. Governments speak in favor of promotional rates to new 
industry, and so on. In the model envisioned here, environmental 
regulators would estimate public damages from pollution. A lot is 
already known about the measurement of such damages.87 Much 
more can be learned in the process of hearings. It is more in keeping 
with the traditional talents of a public body to determine public 
damages, based in part on economic input, than to prescribe what 
technologies are appropriate for the private sector. With this system, 
one expects that the social regulatory job would be accQmplished 
much more effectively. 
The interest of pollution control would then be served by assessing 
public damages, along with other costs, against the electric utility 
and hence including public damages in rates to be paid by power 
86 For a description of the status of monitoring, see L. LAVE & G. OMEN, CLEARING THE 
AIR: REFORMING THE CLEAN AIR ACT 19-23, 42, 46 (1981). 
87 See A. FREEMAN, THE BENEFITS OF AIR AND WATER POLLUTION CONTROL (1979). 
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consumers. Provision should be made for continuous adjustment of 
such assessments in accordance with pollution output. The polluter's 
profit maximization would be achieved by curtailing pollution as long 
as the public damages exceeded the costs of control. Finally, this 
system would provide continuing incentive to find better ways of 
controlling pollution. 88 
This concept incorporates the rationale of emissions charges with 
(1) the expertise that should be built into environmental regulation 
and (2) the institutional context of rate setting that is integral to 
public utility regulation. The concept is well suited for pollution 
control in electric utilities. Whether the same concept can be ex-
tended to other industries is a further question, but answers are 
more likely to evolve if we take the first step-introduce it in indus-
tries subject to economic regulation. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Economic regulation and social regulation offer contrasting pat-
terns in origin, purpose, and effect. They interface in the electric 
utility industry, especially in the control of air pollution and costs 
arising therefrom. The result has been a suppression of the public 
interest in rate control for the sake of pollution control. This is not 
to say that we are succeeding at pollution control but only that the 
needs of the latter are conceived in such a way as to override those 
of rate control. 
Social regulation (pollution control in this study) is perceived as 
an absolute and is compromised according to no consistent logic. The 
compromising comes about as a result of the inherent unenforcea-
bility of the command-and-control system employed generally for 
pollution control. Economic regulation treats the results of social 
regulation as data in determining costs for the purpose of setting 
electric power rates. Economic regulation also goes further to 
smooth the path for the adoption of pollution control investments by 
giving them preferential treatment in a new (since 1976) widespread 
acceptance of construction work in progress (CWIP) as a part of the 
rate base. The same preferential treatment of pollution control in-
vestments occurs in national tax policy, which especially impacts 
electric utilities and hence cost control in electric power regulation. 
88 Consistent with the logic of economic theory, the revenue from such assessments should 
go to the public treasury. It should not go to compensate victims. For a standard textbook 
exposition, see P. BURROWS, THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF POLLUTION CONTROL 98-107 (1980). 
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Some glimmers of a cost-effective approach to pollution control 
are apparent in the use by social regulators of offsets, bubbles, and 
ERC's. These instruments, in principle, at least, permit greater 
economic efficiency. Despite the promise of greater efficiency and 
the significance of offsets, bubbles, and ERC's for cost control, eco-
nomic regulatory commissions have not been involved in their de-
velopment. 
This article proposes an approach toward alleviating the several 
difficulties noted above. The approach would combine economic and 
social regulation, and therefore introduce cost considerations into 
social regulation. This approach would (1) bring greater efficiency to 
pollution control and (2) place the decision on the extent of pollution 
control in a public forum, where the trade-off between costs and 
benefits could be explicitly considered. A corollary advantage would 
be to strengthen economic regulation to the extent that it has been 
compromised by existing pollution control policy. Moreover, this 
approach might provide insights into the extent to which pollution 
control policy in general can be made more flexible and more effective 
elsewhere in the economy. 
